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Abstract. The recent tendency of businesses toward voluntary disclosure has improved the quality 
of financial reporting. High-quality financial reporting helps users of financial information trust the 
business, and thus creates value for the business. Also, during the last decade there has been a 
profound revolution in information technology as a result of the Internet, and obviously accounting 
has been directly affected by this change. The present study divides voluntary disclosure into two 
groups of financial and non-financial information and investigates the effects of fundamentals on 
voluntary disclosure by businesses. The population is composed of 65 companies listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2012. The hypothesis testing results show that firm size, 
business complexity, earnings volatility, and firm value had a significant and positive impact on 
voluntary disclosure, whereas financial leverage had a significant and negative impact on voluntary 
disclosure, while no relationship was observed between voluntary disclosure and financial 
performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of privatization and economic growth, shareholding has 
grown to become a public trend. The increasing number of shareholders and 
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active institutions in the financial sector, including but not limited to investment 
companies, rating agencies, mutual funds, brokerage firms, and investment 
advisory firms, necessitates broad studies on finance and accounting. Due to the 
sudden changes in the stock market structure, policy makers need to enact laws 
and regulations for companies to minimize the possibility of misrepresentation 
and encourage disclosure of information. These policies prepare companies for 
global stock exchange markets. 
 Information published on a web site on the Tehran stock exchange listed firms 
is immediately available anywhere in the world at the same time. This contrasts 
with print-based information, which could take from a few minutes (e.g., a fax of 
a quarterly report) to many days for a mailed copy of a printed annual report. The 
AICPA‟s Special Committee on Financial Reporting found that users wish to 
know about critical transactions and events as soon as possible. Speedy release of 
such information can be made through releases on the corporate Web sites. 
Further, the web site can readily host complete archives of corporate press 
releases as well as in-depth background on products and services. 
The Web provides a form of dissemination that can provide a flexible format to 
present forward-looking information. The recent webcasting by a number of 
corporations of earnings calls and analysts briefings shows how the Web can 
provide a vehicle for forecasts. At the same time, the Web can reduce some of the 
inherent risks to corporations by providing forecast information, for example, 
making explicit use of safe-harbor provisions. Among the most important areas 
are studies investigating information disclosure by companies as well as investor 
behavior, attempting to identify the fundamentals underlying different investor 
decision-making under equal circumstances. Scholars, analyzers, and empiricists 
(Verrecchia, 1983; Hughes, 2000) have concerned themselves with the incentives 
of companies for voluntary disclosure. In recent decades numerous researchers 
(Verrecchia, 1983, 2001; Hughes, 2000) have sought to identify variables defining 
the behavior of shareholders and other stakeholders. The present study adds 
further to the mentioned studies. 
Verrecchia (2001) maintained that global investors and creditors base their 
decisions on the information reported in different economic, financial, and 
nonfinancial reports provided by stock exchange listed companies. Prior to 
decision-making concerning investment on a specific share, investors and 
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creditors also take into account profitability, financial particulars, and 
nonfinancial particulars including staff information, Board Members‟ salary and 
benefits, and internal stock transfers. Therefore, voluntary disclosure, undertaken 
by many companies listed on the world‟s most credible stock exchange markets, 
is a logical development of basic information disclosure in annual financial 
reports, necessarily reflecting the information pertaining to the economic realities 
of a company in a meaningful, transparent, and comparable manner (Ettredge, et 
al. 2002). In Iran, with the enactment of the Internal Auditing By-Law as well as 
the By-Law of Corporate Governance the first steps have been taken toward 
voluntary disclosure on the part of companies. However, traditional and not so 
comprehensive and detailed disclosure of general information in the reports of 
Board of Directors or exclusive websites of companies, and very little in notes 
accompanying financial reports are still the only sources for optional and 
voluntary disclosure of information by Iranian companies. 
As the supply of Web-based financial information increases, investor demand 
for Web-based financial reporting is also increasing. There are now many millions 
of individual investors throughout the world who use the Web to research 
corporations as well as to make direct equity investments on both local and 
foreign bourses. Professional investors and managers use the Web to supplement 
proprietary databases (Ettredge et al., 2002). Studies on voluntary disclosure have 
been conducted in many developed countries (Debreceny et al., 2001). In order to 
protect the interests of public investors and the other parties in the market, a legal 
and efficient system of disclosure needs to be devised. With the development of 
securities market in many developed countries including the US (10-K Act) and 
East Asian countries such as China, a large amount of legal information 
concerning public disclosure of information has been published by the listed 
companies on Stock Exchange Markets for public consideration. Yet, scholars, 
analysts, and empiricists have regrettably not considered specific laws focusing on 
the incentives of firms for voluntary disclosure. Analytical studies indicate how 
competition influences disclosure levels (Verrecchia, 1983; Marston and Shrives, 
1991), and how disclosure is employed as a signal for a firm‟s value. The present 
study is specifically concerned with the voluntary disclosure of information on the 
intellectual capital and knowledge assets in the Tehran Stock Exchange. This 
approach fills some of the mentioned research gaps and further develops the 
related literature on a global level. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND REVIEW OF THE RELATED 
LITERATURE 
Disclosure, in its simple and general sense, is defined as transferring and 
presenting economic information associated with the financial status and 
performance of firms, whether financial or nonfinancial, quantitative or in other 
forms. If it is made compulsory through sources of law, this disclosure is referred 
to as „mandatory disclosure‟, and if it is not mandated by any specific regulation, 
it is considered „voluntary disclosure‟. Furthermore, disclosure implies presenting 
a minimum amount of information in firm reports, based on which a reasonable 
evaluation of the firm‟s relative risks and value can be drawn and which can assist 
information users in this regard (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). 
Both traditional (mainly monetary) and voluntary disclosure (mainly non-
monetary) are efficient sources of information for stakeholders. Empirical studies 
on voluntary disclosure have a rather long history, commenced by Verrecchia, 
(1983) and followed by a plethora of complementary studies concerned with 
investigating the influence of other company features on disclosure, including 
size, type of stock exchange admission, leverage, and administrative structure 
(Table 1). Hughes (2000) investigated the Internet corporate reporting practices of 
Greek listed companies. The aim was twofold: to contribute to the growing 
literature by examining Internet corporate reporting for a small open European 
capital market; and to present a model of online dissemination of information by 
companies of all size in Greece. An Internet Disclosure Index (IDI) of 50 items 
was constructed, which incorporated content and presentation criteria. A total of 
141 corporate websites were screened, and both partial and aggregate scores 
produced. The scores show that the Greek companies have much work to do in 
order to enhance the investor relations activities on the Internet. On average, the 
larger, more established companies have significantly higher levels of disclosure 
for both financial and non-financial data. 
Larrán and Giner (2001) studied the use of the Internet by Spanish companies 
to disclose financial information. We also discuss the reasons why companies use 
new technologies to communicate with interested parties and its consequences. 
The empirical research was based on companies listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange. We analyze not only the information provided, but also the factors that 
explain the different attitudes of companies toward this vehicle for investors 
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relationships. The results show that size is the main factor that explains not only 
the quantity but also the quality of financial information. 
Expenses for the development and collection of detailed information can be 
rather higher for small companies compared with large corporations. As in large 
corporations, the mentioned information has already been developed for internal 
reporting to the administration. Therefore, its disclosure does not incur extra 
expenses (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Larrán and Giner (2001) also maintained that 
production and dissemination of information is a costly activity and larger 
corporations probably have the required resources and expert staff for the 
dissemination of financial reports with high disclosure levels and, consequently, 
higher compliance with the disclosure regulations. It can thus be concluded that 
disclosure costs per unit are reduced and as a result large corporations disclose 
higher amounts of information. As noted by Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Stigler 
(1964), considering the available economic facilities for information production 
and storage, large corporations are inclined to spend more resources for 
information production, and disclosure of information is higher in large 
corporations than small companies. Owusu-Ansah (1998) found that the response 
to larger negative earnings is mostly obtained through voluntary disclosure by 
companies. Many studies indicate the effects of disclosure on the cost of capital 
(Botosan, 1997) and the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998). There is also much 
research on corporate governance and disclosure (Chtourou et al., 2001; Peansell 
et al., 2001; Xie et al., 2001; Beekes et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Eng and Mak, 
2003). In Iran, it seems there are significant research gaps in this area; few studies 
have been conducted on the subject under discussion, with each addressing only 
small portions of voluntary disclosure literature (Foroughi, 2008; Kashanipour 
and Rahmani, 2009; Sajadi et al., 2009; Bayat et al., 2012). Taking into account 
different stakeholder groups, the present study attempts to develop further the 
literature in many aspects nationally and in a few aspects worldwide. 
Debreceny et al. (2002) had three objectives: (1) to identify design attributes 
for Web-based financial reporting; (2) to rank those attributes; and (3) to pilot test 
the Web as a survey tool. Sixty-one attributes were developed from prior studies. 
The subjects were the subscribers of the “Double Entries” email newsletter. In 
terms of completeness, the respondents suggested seven additional attributes. 
Regarding the second objective, some surprises were found. In terms of 
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presentation, the respondents were moderately adverse to downloading files, gave 
relatively low ratings to “bells and whistles,” and preferred hyperlinks and other 
navigation aids such as tables of content over search and query functions. 
Regarding the third objective, the response rate was 13.2%, which was at the low 
end of response rates reported by similar projects. 
O'Dwyer (2001 and 2003) investigated first-hand the incentives of directors for 
social information disclosure in annual reports. The results showed that directors 
maintain that social pressures necessitate the accountability of companies, and 
disclosure of information in annual reports is deemed as a gesture of redeeming 
their legitimacy. 
Another study by Ettredge et al., (2001) investigated the influence of 
governance, corporate governance mechanisms, and firm-specific characteristics 
on the voluntary disclosure of Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies. The 
results indicated that sole proprietorship, existence of an audit committee, firm 
size, and leverage are significantly related to voluntary disclosure. Their findings, 
moreover, indicated an understanding of disclosure behavior in state-owned 
entities during the privatization process in China. This study intends to investigate 
different governance variables and firm-specific characteristics within the 
framework of Stakeholder Theory. 
Ettredge, et al. (2001) focused on the integrity of Internet Financial Reporting 
(IFR) by reference to the adequacy of underlying corporate governance 
procedures. Using a sample of 100 large European companies, a questionnaire 
survey was used to identify whether or not governance procedures that 
specifically address the distinguishing features of Web-based financial reporting 
are used by large companies. The results confirm the trend identified in prior 
research of increasing Internet usage to replicate paper-based financial 
information. Responses to the questionnaire also suggest that concerns about the 
integrity of IFR are justified. Erroneous assumptions and assertions by 
respondents regarding the security of IFR, in addition to knowledge of work 
undertaken by external auditors, indicate limited engagement with IFR by 
management of large European companies. 
In Australia, Ashbaugh, Johnstone, and Warfield (1999) utilized Legitimacy 
Theory to explain the changes in disclosure of environmental reports by 
enterprises for periods in which authorities, including the government and 
Ghasempour & Yusof                         The Effect of Fundamental Determinants on Voluntary Disclosure … 43 
Environmental Protection Organization, emphasized compliance with 
environmental protection regulations. The results indicated that during the years 
companies were pressured to comply with environmental protection regulations, 
their disclosure tended to be more desirable and comprehensive in this regard, as 
compared with the other years. They also found that regulatory requirements 
concerning environmental protection compel enterprises to turn to environmental 
disclosure. It seems that business entities struggle to retain their legitimacy via 
voluntary disclosure when they have violated a social contract. 
Deegan et al. (2002) conducted a study on the methods of social and 
environmental disclosure employed by Australian companies. The results 
supported the legitimacy-seeking incentives of directors of socio-environmental 
information-disclosing companies. In another study, Kashanipoor et al. (2009) 
investigated the relationship between voluntary disclosure of a company and the 
number of its non-executive directors. Their sample was composed of 239 
companies, and their disclosure checklist listed 71 items. Their results showed 
that there was not a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the Board. 
Sajadi et al. (2009) studied the relationship between five nonfinancial 
characteristics of Tehran Stock Exchange listed companies and the quality of their 
financial reporting. To measure the financial reporting quality, an index was 
employed containing 155 items, following Iran Accounting Standards and other 
disclosure pertaining regulations, to investigate possible relationships between the 
firm size, type of auditing institute, type of industry, ownership structure, and 
company age, and financial reporting quality, using models of multiple regression. 
The results showed that firm size, company age, and type of industry maintained 
significant positive relationships, while ownership structure had a negative 
relationship with the financial reporting quality. Moreover, the relationship 
between type of auditing institute and financial reporting quality was not 
significant. 
In their applied descriptive-survey study, Bayat et al. (2012) investigated the 
feasibility of social reporting by Tehran Stock Exchange listed companies, 
collecting the data using questionnaires. They concluded that social reporting is 
not well-received for a number of reasons: absence of a proper accounting 
information system, reluctance of directors to disclose company‟s social costs, 
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absence of legal standards, and high costs of developing social reports. They also 
provided evidence indicating that directors are more inclined to disseminate 









on site (%) 
Louwers, Pasewark and 
Typpo (1996) 
March 1996 Top 150 Fortune 500 companies 65% 37% 
Petravik and Gillett 
(1996) 
May 1996 Top 150 Fortune 500 companies 69% 55% 
Flynn and Gowthorpe 
(1997) 
December 1996 Top 100 Fortune 500 companies 89% >71% 
Ashbaugh, Johnstone 
and Warfield (1999) 
November 1997 - 
January 1998 
290 Non-financial US listed companies 87% 70% 
Deller, Stubenrath and 
Weber (1999) 
January 1998 Top 100 Standard & Poor companies 95% 91% 
Ettredge, Richardson 
and Scholz (2001) 
May 1998 
259 AIMR companies plus 231 Compustat 
computer technology and biotechnology 
companies 
82% >80% 
FASB (2000) January 1999 Top 100 Fortune 500 companies 99% 93% 
UK 
Hussey, Guiliford and 
Lymer (1998) 
August 1997 FT-SE 100 companies 75% 54% 
Deller, Stubenrath and 
Weber (1999) 
January 1998 FT-SE 100 companies 85% 72% 
Hussey, Guiliford and 
Lymer (1998) 
March 1998 FT-SE 100 companies 91% 63% 
Craven and Marston 
(1999) 
July 1998 Largest 200 UK companies 74% 71% 
Europe 
Gowthorpe and Amat 
(1999) 
July 1998 All Spanish listed companies 19% 49% 
Hedlin (1999) September 1998 60 listed Swedish companies 98% 83% 
Deller, Stubenrath and 
Weber (1999) 











Brennan and Hourigan 
(2000) 




94 companies listed on the Irish Stock 
Exchange 






Lybaert (2002) July 2000 188 AEX companies 86% 94% 
Marston and Polei 
(2004) 
July 2000 Top 100 DAX companies 100% 99% 
Table 1. Survey of relevant previous research 
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In addition to the above examples and table, many scholars have struggled in 
recent decades to identify the defining variables in explaining firm behavior on 
Internet reporting. The present study is an attempt to develop these studies further. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This is a descriptive-library study in terms of data collection, and an applied study 
in terms of the objective. Furthermore, as concerns hypothesis testing, the 
research is classified as correlational, adopting a deductive-inductive approach, 
and of causal-comparative type. In terms of sampling method, it is a semi-
empirical study. Initially the population was studied, including Tehran Stock 
Exchange listed companies who were active from March 2005 to 2012. For mean 
calculation for some of the variables, the period was extended to include March 
2002. Then, the companies lacking the required characteristics were excluded, and 
the sample was ultimately selected from among the remaining companies. The 
designated variables were later extracted from different information sources, 
databases, and financial reports of the sample companies, and, consequently, the 
hypotheses were tested. 
3.1 Sample and sampling procedure 
The population of the present study was Tehran Stock Exchange listed 
companies who were active from March 2005 to 2012. Approximately 330 
companies have been active on the Tehran Stock Exchange since March 2002. 
However, for mean calculation of some variables, the period has been extended to 
include March 2002, adding up to 320 active companies. Tehran Stock Exchange 
Organization was the research location. The research period was from March 
2002 to March 2012. As for hypothesis testing, the companies were selected as 
sample only if: 
1. The company is not in the financial intermediation industry, as the capital 
structure of these institutes are different; 
2. The company has been listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange since March 
2002; 
3. The company‟s ticker symbol does not suffer a significant halt (i.e. does 
not suffer a halt of more than three months on the stock market board); 
4. The company‟s data are available. 
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Having considered the above conditions, the population shrank to 182 
companies, out of which 65 companies were randomly selected and analyzed as 
the sample. The pertinent data were investigated for a seven-year period, i.e. a 
total of 455 observations (year-company) were tested for hypothesis testing. 
𝑛 ≥
𝑁 𝑍𝛼/2
2 × 𝑃(1 − 𝑃)
 𝑁 − 1 𝜖2 + 𝑍𝛼
2
2 × 𝑃 1 − 𝑃 
= 65 
3.2 Research Hypotheses 
To achieve the objectives, the research hypotheses are addressed in two separate 
divisions. 
Primary Hypotheses: 
A. There is a significant relationship between company fundamentals and 
voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
B. There is a significant relationship between company fundamentals and 
voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information. 
Secondary Hypotheses Group 1: 
A-1.There is a significant relationship between the company‟s market value and 
levels of voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
A-2.There is a significant relationship between the firm size and levels of 
voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
A-3.There is a significant relationship between access to growth opportunities and 
levels of voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
A-4.There is a significant relationship between complexity of business and levels 
of voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
A-5.There is a significant relationship between financial performance and levels 
of voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
A-6.There is a significant relationship between earnings volatility and levels of 
voluntary disclosure of financial information; 
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Secondary Hypotheses Group 2: 
B-1.There is a significant relationship between the company‟s market value and 
levels of voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information; 
B-2.There is a significant relationship between the firm size and levels of 
voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information; 
B-3.There is a significant relationship between access to growth opportunities and 
levels of voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information; 
B-4.There is a significant relationship between complexity of business and levels 
of voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information; 
B-5.There is a significant relationship between financial performance and levels 
of voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information; 
B-6.There is a significant relationship between earnings volatility and levels of 
voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information; 
3.3 Research variables and how they are calculated 
Research variables are listed below as employed in the first section: 
1. Voluntary Disclosure Index (VolDiscT) (Francis et al., 2008, Bayat, 2012): 
voluntary disclosure is defined as disclosure of information by companies besides 
what is mandated by Iranian Accounting Standards, including the entire financial 
and nonfinancial items, not listed on the Adequacy of Disclosure Checklist. 
Different studies in the pertinent literature have adopted various criteria and 
scores for measuring voluntary disclosure: management forecasts, managerial 
speeches, self-constructed scores, and standard scores constructed by credible 
rating agencies (Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
Scores and Standard & Poor's (S&P) Transparency and Disclosure Scores, for 
instance), to mention a few. The self-constructed score was selected for measuring 
voluntary disclosure for two reasons: first, Brennan and Hourigan (2000) have 
stated that self-constructed scores are more trustworthy, and properly measure 
what they stand for (validity). Self-constructed rating scores are more successful 
than standard disclosure indices especially in cases where many questions are 
raised concerning the efficiency of externally designed measuring indices (e.g. 
whether this rating procedure is capable of properly measuring the changes in 
disclosure approaches taken by the company). To extract voluntary disclosure 
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index, this study employed a weighted disclosure index for measuring the 
disclosure score of each and every company; a disclosure index was developed to 
this end, composed of approximately 112 financial and 131 nonfinancial items 
(Bayat, 2012). 
Every individual item was assigned a unique score, depending on the perceived 
importance and weight and extent of disclosure by the company. These scores 
were mostly retrieved from the companies‟ websites and Board reports. Voluntary 









   
In which: 
VolDiscj is the disclosure weight index for the company j, and iw  represents the 
assigned weight to the informational item i, as disclosed by the company j. 
2. Access to Growth Opportunities (M/B) = market/book ratio or price/earnings 
ratio (P/E) (Lybaert, 2002). 
3. Leverage = Total Average Debt/Total Average Assets. 
4. Size = natural logarithm of the company‟s total average stock market value. 
5. Complexity: total receivables and inventory/total assets (Badavar, 2009). 
6. Firm Value: to calculate Tobin‟s Q, the model proposed by Marston and Polei 
was employed. Their proposed index follows: 
( ) ( )
( )






The ultimate proposed models for investigating the effects of company 
fundamentals on voluntary disclosure were extracted as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
/VolDiscT Fvalue Size M B Leverage Complexity
ROE EarnVol
     
  
      
   
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
1 /VolDisc Fvalue Size M B Leverage Complexity
ROE EarnVol
     
  
      
   
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0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
2 /VolDisc Fvalue Size M B Leverage Complexity
ROE EarnVol
     
  
      
   
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Descriptive Analyses 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of research variables. The values were 
obtained and analyzed using SPSS, Eviews, Stata, and Excel. Results from 
analyzing descriptive statistics revealed that the obtained scores for the total 
voluntary disclosure index fluctuated between 13 and 646. This high dispersion of 
scores indicates the absence of a unified approach among companies for 
information disclosure. Mean disclosure index score (VOLDISCT) was 126, with 
a standard deviation of 105.255. High standard deviation of the obtained scores is 
probably due to the major difference in firm sizes of companies listed on Tehran 
Stock Exchange. Furthermore, average obtained scores for secondary voluntary 
disclosure indices, namely, shareholder value creation (VOLDISC1), customers 
and products (VOLDISC2), intellectual capital and human resources 
(VOLDISC3), social and environmental reporting (VOLDISC4), and corporate 
governance (VOLDISC5), were obtained at 94.598, 14.687, 29,570, 6.744, and 
5.798, respectively. This is indicative of the fact that companies are more inclined 
to disclose the information pertaining to their financial performance and much 
less their nonfinancial information, especially that pertaining to their corporate 
governance and socio-environmental reporting. 
Variable 
Mean Median Max Min St. Deviation 
Business Complexity 0.474 0.4597 3.757 0.029 0.327 
Leverage 0.661 0.672 1.903 0.186 0.168 
Growth Opportunity (M/B) 3.840 2.092 47.566 0.104 4.960 
Size 12.884 12.725 16.945 9.500 1.546 
Return on Equity 0.610 0.407 5.672 - 1.177 0.733 
Secondary Disclosure Index (VOLDISC1) 94.598 84.5 312 0 57.446 
Secondary Disclosure Index (VOLDISC2) 14.687 12 110 0 13.883 
Secondary Disclosure Index (VOLDISC3) 29.570 16 260 0 38.128 
Secondary Disclosure Index (VOLDISC4) 6.744 3 57 0 9.624 
Secondary Disclosure Index (VOLDISC5) 5.798 3 43 0 6.262 
Secondary Disclosure Index (VOLDISCT) 151.361 126 646 13 105.255 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables  
Normality Test – since the analyses in this section are conducted using Dynamic 
Panel Estimator (GMM), data normality is not prioritized. Nevertheless, Jarque-
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Bera and Shapiro-Wilk tests were followed through for data normality, and cases 
of non-normality were normalized using features of STATA software. 
4.2 Step One: Panel or Mixed Model Identification (F-Limer Test) 
Prior to model estimation, it needs to be identified whether the model is with 
single or multiple y-intercepts, i.e. whether there is a panel or mixed distribution. 
F-Limer test was utilized to this end. Results of the mentioned tests for models 
pertaining to the first theory are presented in Table 3. 
Here, the H0 implies non-panel distribution. As shown by the results, except for 
sub-model 2 (Model2), the models maintain panel distribution. As stated above, 
panel data have singly y-intercept, while mixed data have multiple y-intercepts. 
Model Model T Model1 Model2 
F-Statistics 1.728 1.861 1.169 
Prob>F 0.0013 0.0003 0.2069 
2 - statistic 116.919 124.691 0.0319 
Prob>
2  0.0001 0.000 86.523 
Number of observations 573 573 573 
Model type Panel Panel Mixed 
Table 3. Panel or Mixed Model Identification (F-LimerTest) 
4.3 Step Two: Random Effects Test and Hausman Test 
Having determined the type of y-intercept, the next issue to deal with is whether 
the discussed y-intercepts are fixed or random. From a theoretical point of view, if 
all the y-intercepts of the population are present, the model will be a fixed effect 
model. However, it should be kept in mind that in the case where the conditions 
justify random effect estimation theory, a Hausman Test needs to be conducted 
primarily, and if that rejects, a fixed effect model is the correct procedure. The H0 
of Hausman test proved that the model is a random effects model. The important 
point to be considered here is that the basis of Hausman test is that the test is 
required to be estimated randomly first, and only then can the Hausman test be 
conducted. Results from the above tests for the first model are in Table 4. 
Model Model T Model1 Model2 
Wald chi2 (7) 9.167 8.532 - 
Prob> chi2 0.241 0.288 - 
Final Result Random Effects Random Effects  
Table 4. Random Effects and Hausman Tests for the Research Models 
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As shown by the results, the main model, as well as sub-model 1, is required to 
be estimated as the random effects of y-intercepts. 
4.4 Step Three: Heteroscedasticity Test 
One of the problems of a regression model is the Heteroscedasticity of modeling 
errors imposed by the violation of the hypothesis: 
2( )iVar U I  
Such an issue in the regression will cause the OLS estimation results to be no 
longer efficient. The H0 here is Homoscedasticity. 
Generalized least squares were adopted for cases of approved 
Heteroscedasticity. 
4.5 Step Four: Autocorrelation Test 
Another recurrent problem in a regression model is autocorrelation between the 
residuals. Autocorrelation is violation of one of the standard assumptions of the 
regression model (the assumption: COV (ui, …, uj)=0). Thus, the OLS estimation 
technique loses the best linear unbiased estimator (BLE) feature, and, as a result, 
the statistical inference would render unreliable. The autocorrelation problem can 
exist as first order autoregressive process (AR(1)), higher orders, or moving 
average process (MA(q)). The H0 here is the absence of autocorrelation. In cases 
observed with first order autocorrelation, coefficient estimates such as AR(1) 
were used to obviate autocorrelation. 
4.6 Step Five: Final Estimate of Regressive Models 
The final model is consequently estimated in the final step subsequent to 
diagnostics. Results of model estimates are given in Table 5. 
As observable from the results depicted in Table 4, the t-statistics pertaining to 
the variables of firm size and complexity of business have significant and positive 
relationship with the voluntary disclosure levels of financial and nonfinancial 
information at the significance level of 0.05 in all the three models. The 
mentioned statistics for the same variables are 2.958 and 2.746 in the main model 
respectively. In other words, the results show that larger corporations and 
companies with higher business complexity are more inclined to disclose their 
information, probably due to the fact that they wish to assure their shareholders 
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that the company‟s resources are properly managed and administered. The 
pressures of government, other organizations, and media can also be regarded as 
contributing factors. The negative coefficient of access to growth opportunities, 
on the other hand, implies that the company has access to a range of opportunities 
for possible sales promotion, and is reluctant to disclose further pertinent 
information to maintain its competitive edge. The t-statistics of this variable is -
2.505 in the main model. In contrast, according to Table 4, there is no significant 
relationship between variables of financial leverage, financial performance 
(profitability), and earnings volatility and voluntary disclosure, i.e. desirable 
financial conditions do not necessarily trigger higher information disclosure, and 
possibly other leverages are the contributing factors in this case. 
Model ModelT Model1 Model2 
y-intercept 3.222 3.024 0.813 
 (9.351) *** (9.912) *** (1.624) 
Access to growth opportunities -0.189 -0.130 -0.449 
 (-2.505) *** (-1.921) ** (-3.167) *** 
Size 0.135 0.097 0.291 
 (2.958) *** (2.402) *** (4.471) *** 
Financial Leverage 0.169 0.069 0.183 
 (1.483) (0.671) (1.114) 
Complexity of Business 0.134 0.141 0.175 
 (2.746) *** (3.246) *** (2.665) * 
Financial Performance 0.012 0.009 0.037 
 (0.330) (0.287) (0.725) 
Earnings Volatility 0.009 0.029 -0.123 
 (0.267) (0.914) (-2.432) ** 
Firm Value in the Past Year 0.014 0.111 0.230 
 (0.206) (1.823) (2.474) 
AR(1) - - 0.202 
   (3.416) 
Adj_ R2 0.065 0.076 0.098 
F 4.660 5.238 4.778 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
D.W. 1.700 1.87 1.84 
Number of Observations 366 356 278 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
Table 5. Final Estimate of Regressive Models 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study investigated voluntary reporting of companies concerning two 
divisions of financial and nonfinancial information and analyzed the effects of 
company fundamentals on such reporting. Results from hypothesis testing showed 
that the variables of firm size and complexity of business have significant and 
positive relationship with the voluntary disclosure levels of financial and 
Ghasempour & Yusof                         The Effect of Fundamental Determinants on Voluntary Disclosure … 53 
nonfinancial information. This suggests that larger corporations and companies 
with higher business complexity are more inclined to disclose their information, 
probably due to the fact that they wish to assure their shareholders of the proper 
management of the company‟s resources. Pressures from government, other 
organizations, and the media can also be regarded as additional contributing 
factors. The negative coefficient of access to growth opportunities, on the other 
hand, implies that the company may have access to a range of opportunities for 
possible sales promotion, and is reluctant to disclose further pertinent information 
to maintain a competitive edge. In addition, there is no significant relationship 
between variables of financial leverage, financial performance (profitability), and 
earnings volatility and voluntary disclosure, i.e. desirable financial conditions do 
not necessarily trigger higher information disclosure, and possibly other leverages 
are the contributing factors.  
Accordingly, most of the research hypotheses, except for the two variables of 
financial performance and earnings volatility, are proven at the significance level 
of 0.05. The findings of the present study in terms of the majority of the variables 
are consistent with similar studies conducted in other countries (Skinner, 1994; 
Botosan, 1997, Sengupta, 1998, Xie et al., 2001, Beekes et al., 2002, Klein 2002). 
The results of the present study suggest that in their investment decisions 
analyzers should take into account voluntary disclosure. It is also suggested that 
Tehran Stock Market devises incentives for smaller companies to encourage 
voluntary disclosure further. 
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